Post #6 of my commentary on Heidegger’s anaylsis of Plato’s Theaetetus, written in the lead up to my exhibition: The Aviary
As we saw in the previous post our sense organs do not take up a relationship to the perceivable – yet every perception; hearing, sight, has a bodily character. Perceptions are dispersed through the relevant sensory passageways; hearing is only accessible via the ears, colour through the eyes, each isolated in itself. Yet we see a colour and hear a sound at the same time. (130) This means both acts of seeing and hearing occur at the same point of time, but also that we perceive sound and colour together, “one is given along with the other.”
The question then concerns the statement: “we perceive sound and colour together.” If I say “I hear the sound” or “see the colour” it is clear which sense organ is active. In saying “sound and colour are perceived together” the question then has to be asked, through which sense organ do we perceive the “and” and the “together” of this proposition? The former implies plurality, while the latter implies unity, neither of which can be seen, heard or tasted.
Post #5 of my commentary on Heidegger’s anaylsis of Plato’s Theaetetus, written in the lead up to my exhibition: The Aviary
Our perceptions of objects in their perceivedness converge in a unity. When we see or hear we are not aware of our ears or eyes, “we do not see colour in our eyes, and we do not hear sounds in our ears…we see the colour on the book cover, we hear the sound of the door that someone slams.” (126) All these perceivable objects in their variety, converge in a “single sighted nature,” within “one region of the perceivable surroundings.” (127)
This single region of perceivability is there waiting to take in the plethora of perceptions that we have constantly to deal with. It does not originate from what we see, hear etc. Instead It is already there, waiting upon what converges in it, that which we constantly encounter in perception.
We have a sighted nature which holds up this region of perceivability, and which Plato calls soul. The soul is as one with this region itself: “This self-maintaining region which surrounds us belongs to ourselves, and is thereby a constant sameness;” it is “something in itself that is in or by ourselves.” (Plato) Therefore the soul is that which perceives, in the sense of “taking up the perceiving relationship to the perceivable.” This leads Plato to define the soul as that “which allows us to perceive all the objects of perception through the senses as instruments.”
Post #4 of my commentary on Heidegger’s anaylsis of Plato’s Theaetetus, written in the lead up to my exhibition: The Aviary
Socrates begins his enquiry into the essence of perception by asking about the role of the senses, and by extension the body. It would appear that perception is the relation between what is immediately perceivable: smells, colours, sounds etc, and that which is able to take up a perceiving relationship with them. For smells that is the nose, for colour the eyes, etc. Does this mean that it is the body, through the senses, which has a perceptual relationship with what appears? Or is perception only achieved in passing through them, i.e. are the senses just a passageway to perception?
The second characterisation is agreed upon, with Socrates providing the proof: If perceiving was dispersed to different points on the body, so that the eyes are that which see, the ears that which hear etc, what we see and hear, colour and sound, would also be distributed to the corresponding points on the body. This would mean in order to see we would have to direct ourselves to our eyes, in order to hear we would have to direct ourselves to our ears. The end result would be that we could not hear and see something simultaneously.
This is an impossible state of affairs, therefore its opposite is acknowledged, every perception, rather than being dispersed to various points on the body, converges in a unity. This is not a bodily unity, for the body upholds the dispersion of perceiving through its organs of perception. Instead this unity is the “single sighted nature” that we possess, in which all sensory perceptions converge “in something like an idea” [i.e. knowledge, truth]. The idea is what is sighted, it is both seeing and what is seen in its presence, i.e. it is the thing’s essence that is immediately present before us. (126)
Post #3 of my commentary on Heidegger’s anaylsis of Plato’s Theaetetus, written in the lead up to my exhibition: The Aviary
The first answer that Theaetetus offers in response to Socrates’ question: “what is knowledge?” is that knowledge is perception (aisthesis). Heidegger then asks how this answer is arrived at, what is it in perception that appears to link it to knowledge, understood as the “possession of truth,” and thus to being – an understanding of which “is already included in conceiving anything which one apprehends as an entity.”
For the Greeks the becoming perceived of something in perception is the same as phantasia. This is what a thing appears as, what it shows itself as, its appearance. Heidegger makes the point that appearance should not be understood as illusion, what something seems like. Even so it will be seen that seeming returns at the end of Heidegger’s account of the Theaetetus as a feature of hiddenness i.e. untruth.
Returning to phantasia as appearance; that which we perceive in a perception is there in a state of being perceived, which we take for what it presents itself as. Heidegger gives an example: “the moon itself that appears in the sky, that presents itself and is present; this is something that shows itself.” The moon shows itself as being present, which we take for what it shows itself as, the moon. Therefore aisthesis has a double meaning relating to the perceived in its perceivedness, and our perception in which perceivedness occurs.
Therefore Theaetetus’ thesis is that knowledge, as truth, is this perceivedness of what is seen. That which we perceive in a perception is there before us as something that shows itself as present, as “a kind of unhiddenness.” Perception, aisthesis, is equated with truth as unhiddenness, aletheia, because it “appears the most immediate mode of the unhiddenness of something…the most tangible truth.”
Yet it is still open to question that what becomes manifest in this relationship, between what shows itself and perception, is the unhiddenness of beings as aletheia. For this to be the case our “perceptual comportments,” seeing, hearing etc, through which we have a perception, must “have a relationship to beings as such.” To test whether or not this is the case Heidegger’s analysis focuses on the essence of perception itself, asking whether or not a perceptual comportment “can bring itself into a relationship to beings as beings, such that the unhiddenness of beings is given in the perceivedness occurring in such a comportment.” (121)
Post #2 of my commentary on Heidegger’s anaylsis of Plato’s Theaetetus, written in the lead up to my exhibition: The Aviary
Plato’s Theaetetus is a dialogue, in which the leading question: “what is knowledge?” is posed by Socrates to Theaetetus. Knowledge, a translation of epistememe, has two meanings; it is a practical know-how, which “extends across all possible human activities,” from how to make a pair of shoes to how to conduct a war. It is also understood as seeing or idein. What unites both is their relationship to beings in their unhiddenness, their truth. Seeing is the seeing of beings in their presence, as what they show themselves for. Similarly know-how is disposal over beings in their presence, in their unhiddenness. This leads Heidegger to define knowledge as: “knowing-one’s-way-around in something as the possession of truth.” (120)
Post #1 of my commentary on Heidegger’s anaylsis of Plato’s Theaetetus, written in the lead up to my exhibition: The Aviary
Martin Heidegger’s analysis of Platos’ Theaetetus can be found in The Essence of Truth (Continuum, 2002). The Theaetetus is constructed in the form of a dialogue, between Socrates and Theaetetus, and discusses the nature of knowledge. Heidegger, whose analysis covers only the central section of this conversation, understands knowledge as a form of truth.
As the title of his book suggests, Heidegger’s intention, in this work, is to address the theme of truth, in particular the Greek idea of truth as aletheia, which means unhiddenness, in contrast to our understanding of truth as correctness, given by the Latin term veritas. The Essence of Truth is part of Heidegger’s project to bring into the open what he believes we have long forgotten, that is being, that which is present in addition to what is physically there.
Aletheia is the experience of the unhiddeness of being, what something shows itself as. Heidegger proposes that this return to being as aletheia be re-enacted by examining the essence of truth, by asking “what is truth?” In order to do this aletheia itself must be put into question by exploring what beings are prior to unconcealment, i.e. as hidden, as untruth – pseudos, the false. Therefore the title of Heidegger ‘s analysis, in the second part of The Essence of Truth: “an interpretation of Plato’s Theaetetus with respect to the question of the essence of untruth.”